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The EU is now trying to put democracy back into the heart of its foreign policy. Yet, the EU
and its member states seem to have greater concern for their own energy interests than
engaging with Azerbaijan’s near-autocratic regime. Jana Kobzova, Leila Alieva and Dan
Kennedy call for the EU to pursue a “hug and hold” strategy with Azerbaijan –close
engagement, complemented by holding the regime to its commitments to reform.
The European Union has been partly successful and wholly incoherent in promoting
democracy in its neighbourhood. In the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, democracy is in retreat:
none of the six Eastern Partnership countries are fully democratic and, apart from in Moldova,
democracy scores in the region have been worsening. Clearly, EU efforts to promote
democracy are failing to work as intended.
Nowhere in the eastern neighbourhood is this challenge more evident than in Azerbaijan. The
upcoming Eurovision Song Contest, which takes place in Baku this week, has drawn attention
to the many problems and paradoxes this country presents for the EU’s efforts to promote
democracy. The regime of President Ilham Aliyev has almost eliminated political opposition
through a combination of state repression, election manipulation and harassment of
independent media.
The EU is now trying to put democracy back at the heart of its foreign policy. But while it has
taken a tough approach to Belarus – another systematic abuser of human rights in the
Eastern Partnership region – it seems more concerned about its own energy interests and
security in Azerbaijan than for the state of democracy there. Although they have been vocal
about democracy in Azerbaijan, individual member states and the EU institutions have in
reality co-operated with the regime in Baku without imposing conditionality, which has brought
Europe few benefits and continues to discredit the EU in the eyes of Azerbaijani society.
Since the mid-1990s, the government of Azerbaijan has restarted economic growth and expanded society’s
welfare. Thanks to the country’s rich oil and gas reserves, Azerbaijan’s fortunes, especially in the last 10
years, have changed impressively. However, as the country has progressed in economic terms, it has
regressed in terms of corruption and democratic governance. The influx of oil money has helped the regime
of Ilham Aliyev to solidify his own position and steer Azerbaijan towards full-fledged autocracy. Nevertheless
the volume of oil extracted in Azerbaijan peaked in 2010 and is set to decline. The government has failed to
translate the growth figures into corresponding social indicators and while it hopes to generate more revenue
from increased gas exports, experts suggest the income will not suffice to compensate for the decline of oil
revenues. Unless it reforms and diversifies, Azerbaijan’s economic model is unsustainable.
The regime’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies have had little effect on the EU’s approach. Europe’s main
interest in the region is stability of energy supplies and security. Some member states such as France, Italy,
Germany and the UK have big economic interests in Azerbaijan and avoid publicly criticising the country or its
regime. There is little co-ordination between member states and various branches of the European
Commission and EU institutions have often been as incoherent in their approach to Azerbaijan as have
member states. The lack of a more coherent EU approach makes it possible for Baku to ignore criticism and
pursue good relations with “friendly” member states.
While co-operation in the energy sector works well at the
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While co-operation in the energy sector works well at the
level of individual EU energy giants and the government of
Azerbaijan, the EU itself has achieved far more modest
results. The Nabucco gas pipeline, the cornerstone of the
EU’s gas policy, is probably going to be shelved because
Baku seems to favour other competing initiatives.
Similarly, talks on the new Association Agreement (to
deepen Azerbaijan’s political association and economic
integration with the EU) are currently marred in seemingly
endless discussions about the status of the Armenia-
occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region.
The EU has a whole range of tools and a blueprint it can
use to assist countries that want to become members but
has been struggling to find a way to deal with countries
that are not willing to join it. Nevertheless, the EU does
have some leverage. If Azerbaijan is to diversify its oil-
based economy, it will need the EU for technology and
know-how. Much of this can be provided by European
companies, but unless it improves its governance and
judicial system, Azerbaijan will struggle to attract
investment. As the country’s first trading partner, the EU is potentially the most powerful external economic
actor in Azerbaijan. These factors create potential leverage which Europe should use more forcefully to make
Baku restrain its autocratic tendencies. It can do so by pursuing a “hug and hold” strategy – hugging
Azerbaijan but also holding it to its commitments to reform.
At the moment, the EU’s best chance for more reform in Azerbaijan is continued engagement – rather than
isolation – of the Baku government. The EU should prioritise initiatives aimed at the transfer of know-how,
capacity-building in the public sector and exchange programmes for junior and mid-level bureaucrats – but it
should carefully monitor results and insist on participation of NGOs and non-state actors, such as
independent experts, in all stages of the process.
“Hugging” Azerbaijan does not mean embracing only its government. The EU should give more support to
NGOs, small enterprises, independent media and professional organisations, which can put more pressure
on the regime domestically and create evolutionary change in the future. Given the closeness between Baku
and Ankara, the EU should also solicit more co-operation from Turkey on pushing Azerbaijan to reform. The
EU also needs to do a better job in explaining its actions and demands to Azerbaijani society.
While “hugging” Azerbaijan, Europe should also hold it to the commitments it made by joining the European
Neighbourhood Policy and agreeing action plans. A concerted effort at the EU level to restrict the movement
of those in Azerbaijan who violate human rights on a systematic basis is unlikely, but member states can take
action individually and follow the example set by the UK, which earlier this year adopted a new rule banning
entry for non-EU nationals accused of human rights abuses.
As Azerbaijan grows more authoritarian, Europe faces a choice. It can fully embrace this country and its
society, which is proud of becoming the first-ever Muslim liberal democratic republic in 1918, or it can
continue condition-free dialogue with the regime. If it chooses the second option it risks finding itself a tacit
supporter of autocracy.
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